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Disney Case Study
For many years Disney CEO and Chairman Michael Eisner has ranked near the
top of the list of the most highly paid CEO's in the country. Between 1998 and 2000
Eisner made more than $680 million from the exercise of stock options (Hodgson).
Eisner made $570 million in 1998 alone. News of his compensation ignited a public
discussion on executive compensation and disclosure. Although Eisner's compensation is
unquestionably exorbitant, the lingering question is did he deserve it? If Eisner had
greatly increased shareholder wealth and the value of the company, a case could be made
to justify his compensation. However, this is not case. Evidence shows that $1,000
invested in Disney in 1984, when Eisner took office, would be worth $10,901 in 2001,
representing a 15% annual compound return. This sounds like a decent return; however,
the average return on the S&P 500 would make a $1,000 investment over the same period
worth $8,506, representing a 13% annual compound return. Therefore, under Eisner's
leadership, Disney barely outperformed the market. In 2004, he received a 45% withhold
vote for his reelection from disgruntled shareholders (Plitch). As a result, Eisner was
forced to step down as chairman of the board but remained a member and CEO of the
company. It seemed as if the company was finally responding to shareholders. However,
despite shareholder disapproval, Eisner received compensation of $10.1 million in 2005,
his final year as CEO of Disney. Furthermore, he continues to draw on a $297,779
annual pension from Disney (Plitch).
Eisner's case illustrates the growing concern over executive compensation and
disclosure. The topic has been the subject of recent heated debate over whether
executives deserve huge compensation packages, arguably, at the shareholders' expense.

As was witnessed in the Eisner case with his bid for reelection to the board, sometimes
stockholders are pitted against management, creating agency problems. Also, since
Eisner himself was chairman of the board it is unlikely that the board would place
controls on his compensation. The case study demonstrates a text book case of
entrenched management. Recent legislation passed by the SEC requires companies to
disclose executive compensation in greater detail. Executive compensation has become
one of the biggest issues in corporate governance. Therefore, to achieve an
understanding of the issue it is essential to look at the different methods used to
compensate executives, recent trends, proposed regulation, and the future of executive
compensation.
Methods of Compensation
Companies use different methods to compensate executives. An ideal
compensation package aligns executive incentives with shareholder interests to minimize
agency problems. These methods often include a combination of: salary, bonus, stock
options, stock grants, and pensions. Since the use of stock options has recently been a
subject of great controversy, they will be discussed in greater detail since corporate
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have been linked to stock option grants (HallMurphy). However, the first component of compensation that will be discussed is one
that the average employee can relate to-salary.
Salary
Salary is a fixed amount of a compensation package and does not vary in the short
run (Balsam 35). However, salary can vary in the long run depending on performance.
Normally, companies include clauses in compensation contracts allowing for raises that

are contingent on performance and duration. Since salary is the most risk-free
component of a compensation package it is very important in attracting executive talent,
especially if that individual is risk-averse (Balsam 312).
Bonus
A large portion of companies pay their executives a bonus based on performance.
A bonus is a form of compensation that is conditioned upon the performance of one or
more measures. According to Balsam's book, "An Introduction to Executive
Compensation," these measures can be implicit or explicit, objective or subjective, or
financial or non-financial. Usually, the maximum bonus is expressed as a percentage of
salary; as an employee moves up in the corporate ladder, the percentage of salary that can
be earned as bonus usually increases (Balsam 314). It is not uncommon for a CEO's
bonus to be 100% of salary. In 2005, Wall Street bonuses set a new record of $21.5
billion; the last record of $19.5 billion was during the bull market of 2000 (CNN.com).
Wall Street bonuses increased 15.5% over their levels in 2004 (CNN.com).
Stock Options
Stock options allow the person who receives them to purchase stock at a certain
price usually over a certain period of time. Sometimes the grantee has to wait until the
vesting period is over before the options can be exercised. A vesting period is a specified
amount of time that the grantee must wait before exercising the options. Typically,
grants are exercisable by allowing the grantee to exercise a certain percentage of the
entire grant over the vesting period. An example is allowing the executive to exercise
25% of the grant in the first year of a four year vesting period and the rest at the end of
the period. The use of stock options increased significantly during the 90's and has

declined amid recent controversy (Hall-Murphy). Options allowed companies to align
their incentives with those of managers and provided a form of compensation that did not
require an initial cash outlay. For many of the high tech startup firms of the 90's this form
of compensation seemed optimal. Stock options have been the most controversial form of
compensation due to several events and misuses. The majority of Michael Eisner's
compensation came in the form of stock options, and some of the most prominent
corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have been linked to the excessive use
of options (Hall-Murphy). One of the biggest issues surrounding the use of options is
how companies should account for them.
The rules that govern the accounting for stock options are established by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Accounting Principles Board
(APB), which existed before FASB. The pronouncement that is concerned with the
expensing of stock options is APB Opinion 25, issued in 1972, which states that the
accounting charge for stock options is the difference between the market price of the
stock and the exercise price on the date that the options are granted (Hall-Murphy). As a
result there is no charge for options that have an exercise price that is at or above market
price on the date the options are granted. However, in 1995 FASB released FAS 123
which recommended that companies expense the fair market value of options using an
option pricing model, most prominently the Black-Scholes model (Hall-Murphy). The
pronouncement still allowed companies to continue reporting options under APB Opinion
25, however if they chose to do so they would also be required to disclose the value of
the option grant in a footnote to the financial statements. As late as 2002, only a few
companies were reporting stock options using FAS 123; although, amid corporate scandal

in 2003 more than a 100 companies began to report using FAS 123 (Hall-Murphy). The
reason that so many companies choose not to expense the estimated fair market value of
the options is that it could significantly hurt their bottom line. Furthermore, many startup
companies use a tremendous amount of stock options to attract talent to the firm because
they do not have the resources to pay high salaries or bonuses.
Stock Grants
Stock grants are shares of the company's stock that are given to employees as
compensation. They are valued at the market value of the company's stock and have no
exercise price (Balsam 38). Stock grants are either classified as restricted or unrestricted;
restricted grants cannot be sold until the employee has been with the company for a
certain amount of time, whereas unrestricted shares can be sold at any time (Balsam 38).
The stock grants method of compensation is not as popular as stock options because they
are more expensive and they are not as effective in aligning the interests of the executives
with those of the company.
Pensions
Pensions are a form of deferred compensation which the executive receives after
,

he/she retires from the company (Balsam 39). After retirement the executive receives a
payment or a number of payments. The amounts can either be in accordance with a
pension plan or the executive may have an amount accumulated in a specific pension
account. Accordingly, pensions are classified into defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans. Defined benefit plans distribute payments to employees based on
predetermined benefit formulas, whereas in a defined contribution plan the employer's
contribution is defined by the plan and the employee may add to it (Balsam 175-176).

Recent cuts in employee pensions by major companies have brought pensions to the
public spotlight. As mentioned earlier, Michael Eisner still draws an annual pension
payment of $297,779 from Disney (Plitch). However this seems like nothing when
compared to the annual payment of $6,518,459 to Pfizer executive Henry McKinnell
(The Corporate Library). Recently, similar to Eisner, Mckinnell was the target of a "Vote
No" campaign by Pifzer shareholders and up to 22% of shareholders withheld their
support from board members that supported Mckinnell's pension (Masters). In addition
to normal pensions, companies have even created special retirement programs known as
"Top Hat" plans for key executives to avoid tax consequences (AFL-CIO).
Trends

In 2005 salaries and bonuses for executives rose 7.1 %, after having risen 14.5% in
2004 and 7.2% in 2003 (WSJ/Mercer). The increase in salaries and bonuses for
executives exceeded the 3.6% increase in pay for white-collar workers (WSJ/Mercer).
However, the increase in the median total compensation for executives which includes
salary, bonuses, gains from option exercise, other long-term incentive payouts, and the
value of restricted shares is up 15.8% from 2004 to $6, 049,504 (WSJ/Mercer). This may
seem like a drastic jump, though when compared to the 40.9% increase to $5.9 million in
2004 it is actually very modest (WSJ/Mercer). In 2005, 192 executives exercised stock
options for a median gain of $3,493,440 in comparison to the 197 executives in 2004 for
a median gain of $3,229,072 (WSJ/Mercer). Inflation is not a valid justification, because
it is obvious that the dramatic increase in executive compensation far outpaces the
inflation rate. There is a growing disparity between executive and employee pay.
Currently, a CEO earns 431 times the average worker's pay (Anderson). As executive

pay continues to grow this ratio continues to get larger as employee pay remains
relatively stagnant. This can be observed directly from Figure 1 which plots the growth
of executive compensation against the growth of employee compensation.

Figure 1
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The graph shows that employee compensation has been relatively stable, whereas
executive compensation has experienced significant growth. Employee compensation
has not even kept pace with inflation in recent years, as can be seen by the relationship of
CPI to employee salaries. It can also be observed that executive compensation varies
directly with corporate profits, but is not as volatile. This can be attributed to the variable
compensation components of an executive compensation package such as bonuses, stock

options, and stock grants. However, some experts question as to whether the use of
variable compensation such as stock options is really in the company's interest. Recent
studies have found a correlation between the use of CEO stock options and accounting
and other financial restatements (Norris). Supporters of this view argue that stock options
encourage exec uti ves to "cook the books." A counter argument can be made that
executive compensation rises proportionately with corporate profits as is seen in the
Figure 1. This raises the question of who is charged with determining executive
compensation packages. Some would say it is the executives themselves who control how
much they are compensated.
Another trend in executive compensation is the issue of corporate governance.
The board of a company is charged with compensating the executive, however the
problem is that in many instances the CEO of a company is also the chairman of the
board. This issue was witnessed earlier in the Eisner case. In fact, the AFL-CIO
estimates that the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors at two-thirds of
companies (AFL-CIO). This situation causes agency problems within a company and
allows the executive to extract "rents," the equivalent of a monopolistic profit, from
shareholders (AFL-CIO). This phenomenon raises agency costs and costs to
shareholders. However, recent legislation has been proposed in the Securities and
Exchange Commission to protect shareholders.
Proposed Regulation

On January 17, 2006 the members of the SEC moved to propose a plan that would
make the biggest changes to the disclosure of executive compensation since 1992
(Associated Press). The plan is open to a 60 day public comment period and can take

effect as early as spring of next year (Associated Press). Under the new legislation
companies would be required to provide tables in their annual filings showing the total
annual compensation for the company's chairman, chief financial officer and the next
three highest paid executives (Associated Press). Other provisions of the new legislation
include: the reduction of the level at which executive perks must be detailed from
$50,000 to $10,000, and disclosure of executives' retirement benefits and board
members' compensation (Associated Press). Furthermore, members of the compensation
committee that are not independent must be disclosed (sec.gov). Finally, companies
would be required to explain the objectives behind their executives' compensation. These
new regulations have been proposed to restore investor confidence in the face of booming
executive compensation.
Future of Executive Compensation

Recent scandals and exorbitant abuses of corporate resources have incited public
backlash against excessive executive compensation. However the question as to what is
excessive must be defined first. Executives are at the helm of a company and make the
major decisions which guide its ultimate success or failure. It seems justifiable that a
CEO at the head of a multinational corporation deserves a significant amount of
compensation for his efforts. However, there are three main issues at the heart of current
executive compensation issues: performance, disclosure, and corporate governance. A
CEO should be compensated according to performance by establishing certain measures
to evaluate the CEO's performance. The measures should consist of short-term and longterm objectives. This is to prevent CEO's from sacrificing the long-term wellbeing of the
company for short-term goals for compensatory purposes. A non-performing or mediocre

CEO should not receive compensation beyond his worth. Few would question the worth
of a CEO such as Jack Welch who increased shareholder wealth significantly more than
what he received in compensation. Therefore, I believe the issue at hand is whether the
CEO is worth what he is being paid as opposed to the general increases in executive
compensation. The idea that executives are receiving excessive compensation seems
partly warranted and partly attributed to public hysteria in the wake of major corporate
scandals and abuses of public trust. According to Figure 1, executive compensation has
risen proportionately with corporate profits. If corporate profits were falling and
executive compensation was rising, the point that executive compensation is excessive
would be better validated. The other major issue, currently being dealt with by the SEC,
is disclosure.
Executive compensation should be disclosed to the greatest degree so as to ensure
investor confidence, especially after recent corporate scandals. Stock options should be
expensed according their fair market value. They obviously have worth when they are
granted or else they would not be a part of the compensation package. The disclosure of
executive perks seems justified by the fact that shareholders are essentially paying for
them so they deserve to know about them. To ensure that shareholder interests are being
served by the board of directors corporate governance issues must be emphasized.
CEO's should not be allowed as chairs of the board of directors because this
raises agency problems and causes possible conflicts of interest. Current legislation
requires that all members of the compensation committee who are not independent be
disclosed (sec.gov). However, this legislation does not go far enough. Executives should
not be allowed to hold the chairman position on the board of directors. There should be a

separation of power and a system of checks in balances within the corporate governance
structure. Although it is not clear on how issues such as corporate governance and
agency problems will be dealt with, one thing that is clear is that the public has grown
disenchanted with the current system. In order to maintain public confidence, major
changes must occur to encourage accountability and disclosure within the area of
executive compensation.
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